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ABSTRACT. Three studies examined folk concepts of the good life. Participants
rated the desirability and moral goodness of a life as a function of the happiness,
meaning, and effort experienced. Happiness and meaning were solid predictors
of the good life, replicating King and Napa (1998). Study 1 (N = 381) included
wealth as an additional factor. Results showed little desire for exorbitant
(over moderate) wealth, but also a desire to avoid poverty. When effort was
operationalized as number of hours worked, respondents desired the easy life,
particularly at moderate levels of income. When effort was operationalized as
effortful engagement (Study 2), 186 undergraduates and 178 community adults
rated the hardworking life as morally superior to the easy life. Community adults
preferred meaningful lives of ease, while college students preferred meaningful
lives that involved effort. Study 3 (N = 359) found the meaningful, effortful life
was rated as most morally good, and the happy effortful life was rated as most
desirable, happy, and meaningful. The role of hard work in naïve notions of The
Good Life is discussed.
A number of potential components of the good life require effort –
namely, economic success (Weber, 1930/1976), a sense of purpose
and meaning (Ryff, 1989; Ryff and Singer, 1998, 1990a, 1990b),
effective goal striving (Emmons, 1986), generativity (McAdams and
de St. Aubin, 1992), competence and mastery (White, 1959), and
close relationships (Ryff and Singer, 1998). In addition, conceptions
of optimal human experience often include the quality of challenge,
suggesting that fulfillment comes from effortful engagement (e.g.,
eudaimonia, Waterman, 1990a, 1993; intrinsic motivation, Deci and
Ryan, 1985; flow, Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Thus, when considering
the good life, it is important to examine the role of effort in our
conceptions of the ideal life. After all, simply knowing what makes
a life good may not be sufficient in achieving it. Beliefs about the
means to a good life may shed light on the life choices people make
in their search for fulfillment.
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People Know What It Takes a Lead a Good Life
In a study of folk concepts of the good life (King and Napa, 1998),
we asked participants to make ratings about the desirability and
moral goodness of a life as a function of its happiness, meaning-
fulness, and wealth. We found that folk concepts of the good life
converged with the subjective well-being (SWB) literature in that
happiness and meaning in life overwhelmingly defined the “good
life” and were strong indicators of a morally good life as well. In
contrast, wealth was relatively unimportant to the good life (c.f.,
Diener et al., 1985; Diener et al., 1993). We concluded that people
appear to know what it takes to lead a good life – but at the
same time, it remained puzzling why people continue to behave as
if they do not. For example, UCLA’s survey of college freshman
consistently finds over 70% of its respondents rate “being well-
off financially” as “very important” or “essential” (Astin et al.,
1997). Since 1978, the importance of material wealth, in fact, has
surpassed the importance of developing “a meaningful philosophy
of life” (Astin et al., 1997). Similarly, Keyes (1999) notes that
approximately 26 million Americans lead meaningless lives. These
“languishing” individuals, according to Keyes, may not be suffering
from depression or other illnesses, but they also lack any sense of
positive well-being and purpose in life (see Keyes et al., 2002).
The present studies offer one possible explanation for the discrep-
ancy between conceptions of the good life and the choices that
people make – namely, that people may be unwilling to work hard
to achieve happiness and meaning in life. The present program
of studies, therefore, sought to address the role of effort in folk
concepts of the good life. In particular, if the good life has been
popularized as one long vacation, then we might expect naïve
theories of the good life to ignore the role of hard work.
Why Study Folk Concepts of the Good Life?
In using folk concepts as a means of culturally defining the good
life, we draw heavily upon the work of Jerome Bruner (1990) who
considered folk psychology an “instrument of culture”. Rather than
eschewing folk theories for their inaccuracies, academic psychology
can learn from folk concepts because these notions reflect larger,
culturally-shaped belief systems. As Bruner (1990) described, folk
IS THE GOOD LIFE THE EASY LIFE? 129
psychology is “a system by which people organize their experience
in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world” (p. 35).
Folk theories are related to everyday practices, choices, and beha-
viors, in addition to local meaning systems (Harkness and Super,
1996). Bruner even remarked that “we might do better to study the
nature and origins of the ‘naïve’ psychology” (p. 38) because it is
folk psychology that gives meaning to people’s lives and actions.
Harkness et al. (1996) describe parental beliefs (a form of folk
psychology) as being neither the sole product of individual exper-
ience nor simply ideas that have been “absorbed in ‘prepackaged’
form” through one’s culture. Rather, “cultural belief systems . . .
are at once individually constructed and culturally shared . . . the
product of integration of a variety of experiences in the wider culture
and in the family, dynamically changing in interaction with that
experience, reflecting both individual history and dispositions and
culturally normative ideas” (p. 289). Therefore, rather than treating
folk concepts of the good life as error-ridden and uninformative, we
sought to explore this rich source of meaning in order to further our
understanding of the life well-lived.
Our other aim was to examine whether the role of effort in folk
concepts of the good life shared any features with academic psycho-
logy’s theories of optimal functioning. Other studies of folk theories,
for instance research on parental ethnotheories about the importance
of self-esteem in child-rearing (e.g., Miller et al., 2002), indicate
that folk psychologies are at least partially informed by academic
theories. Thus, before describing the present studies, we examine
popular beliefs about the value of effort and review the role of effort
in a number of theories of optimal functioning in order to illustrate
how we developed our predictions about the role of hard work in
folk concepts of the good life.
The Value of Effort
For most people, effort may be something to be avoided. Adam
and Eve’s punishment was, after all, a lifetime of toil and labor.
And, though TGIF may be a common utterance at the end of the
work week, seldom will one hear the cries of TGIM on Monday
morning. Arguably, exerting effort may even innately aversive (e.g.,
Eisenberger, 1992, 1996). In fact, hard work is just that – hard.
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On the other hand, if people are averse to effort, certainly no
one wants to admit to being lazy. For instance, although experi-
ence sampling studies (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) have found
the average worker spends about 25% of the work day “goofing
off”, a Gallup poll indicates that American workers are quick to
label themselves as “workaholics” or “solid performers at work”
(September 3, 1999). Virtually no one endorsed the self-label of
“an underachiever who gets by with the minimum necessary to
keep [one’s] job”. Laziness often informs negative stereotypes about
others (e.g., Seccombe et al., 1998), and may even have negative
moral implications. Laziness (along with pride and gluttony) was
one of the sins of Sodom (Ezekiel, 16). Thus, it seems unlikely
that a life of chronically low effort would be considered desirable
or morally good.
The Role of Effort in Optimal Human Functioning
Eudaimonia.1 Two distinctions exist among the facets of well-being:
Hedonic versus eudaimonic well-being (Ryan and Deci, 2001).
Whereas hedonic well-being refers to pleasant feeling states, eudai-
monia refers to furthering the development of one’s true potentials
and purposes in living and often is independent of pleasant affect
(Ryff, 1995; Waterman, 1990a). Hedonic happiness, however, can
occur with little or no effort, often as the result of receiving the
things one wants, whereas effort is crucial to the experience of
eudaimonia. Furthermore, because eudaimonic activity expresses
essential aspects of the self, it is accompanied by a sense of
meaningfulness, growth, or mastery.
Intrinsic motivation. Explanations for the processes that underlie
intrinsic motivation include an innate need to feel competent or as
if one has “mastered” a task (Deci and Ryan, 1985; White, 1959).
As in the discussion of eudaimonia, effort plays an important role in
intrinsic motivation because individuals continually seek out situ-
ations that are more and more challenging, gradually increasing
their current level of competence along the way (Danner and Lonky,
1981). To phrase it another way, once a task has been mastered,
greater challenges must be introduced in order for the task to con-
tinue to meet the individual’s competency needs. Consequently,
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intrinsically motivating activities often further one’s capacities, a
quality that resonates with eudaimonic themes (Deci and Ryan,
1985).
Flow. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) describes flow as occurring when
one exerts “voluntary effort to accomplish something difficult and
worthwhile” (p. 3). The hallmark of flow is the matching of both
high levels of skill and challenge. According to Csikszentmihalyi
(1990), while pleasure can be easily attained, it is “impossible to
experience flow without effort” (p. 48). Interestingly, people are
three times more likely to experience flow in work than in leisure,
although most people report that they would rather be doing some-
thing other than working (Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre, 1989).
All three of these theoretical perspectives include the notion of
effortful engagement in optimal human functioning, but none focus
on effort for its own sake. Rather effort is seen as valuable only
when tied to meaningful or challenging activities. If naïve theories
of the good life reflect these notions, then we would predict that
in judging the quality of a life, the influence of effort on judgments
would depend on meaning. With this in mind, we predicted an effort
X meaning interaction such that the meaningful life of hard work
would be considered the most desirable, while a meaningless life of
hard work would be quite undesirable.
Effort and Monetary Reward
While psychological perspectives on optimal functioning indicate
that the combination of effort and meaning is related to heightened
fulfillment, we might also consider the relation between hard work
and other potential aspects of the good life. One of these goods is
material gain. Self-determination theory posits that behavior that is
directed toward attaining extrinsic rewards is associated with lesser
psychological functioning (Kasser and Ryan, 1993, 1996). Yet, it
may be that in the daily living of life, people justify hard work
through its connection to money. In a study examining justifications
for salaries of $2 million dollars, MBA students most frequently
cited performance, talents and abilities, and hard work as justific-
ation (Mitchell et al., 1993). The least endorsed factor was “good
luck”. Therefore, we might expect effort to interact with income to
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predict the desirability of a life. Hard work justified by material gain
might seem a reasonable trade-off.
Furthermore, we might expect this hard work for economic gain
prediction to hold for moral goodness as well. At first, this predic-
tion may seem to contradict traditional religious doctrines. The
valuing of wealth as a moral good is not unusual, however, within
the context of the Protestant work ethic which presents earning
money as an ethical duty. According to Weber’s (1930/1976)
analysis of the Protestant work ethic, economic success might be
considered a reward for following “God’s will”. In support of
Weber’s argument, King and Napa (1998) found that the person
who was judged as most likely to go to heaven was the person who
“had it all” – wealth, happiness, and meaning. If indeed success is
considered a sign of God’s grace, then how hard a person works to
obtain success would be irrelevant in judgments of moral goodness.
Moreover, easy success may be regarded as morally superior to hard
won success – for surely, God wouldn’t allow anyone but his favored
people to turn an easy profit. On the other hand, a more Catholic
world view would predict hard work to be essential to moral good-
ness. Exorbitant wealth paired with little effort may invite suspicion
and harsh moral judgment.
Overview
In three studies, participants examined a “Career Survey” that had
been ostensibly completed by someone rating his or her occupation
(King and Napa, 1998). We sought to examine the good life within
the context of a person’s career for two reasons. First, the relation-
ship between job satisfaction and life satisfaction is well established
(Myers and Diener, 1995). Fifty-one percent of American workers
say that work provides them with a “sense of identity” (Gallup
Survey, August 24–26, 1999). Our second reason for framing the
good life within a career context is that effort with regard to one’s
job may be more salient and quantifiable than effort expended in
other areas. Undoubtedly, a mother’s work “never ends”, but an
estimate of the number of hours on the clock or level of engagement
makes little sense in this context.
In all three studies happiness, meaning, and effort served as our
independent variables. Study 1 included wealth as an additional
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factor, and Study 3 included personal choice. In Study 1, we oper-
ationalized effort as time spent working. In Studies 2 and 3, we
operationalized effort as effortful engagement at work. In all three
studies, participants rated the desirability of the life and the moral
goodness of the target.
Predictions for Study 1
In Study 1, responses of the fictional respondents were manipulated
to be relatively happy or not, to be experiencing a great deal of
meaning or not, to be working hard or not, and to be relatively
wealthy or not. In our previous study (King and Napa, 1998), wealth
was manipulated with only two levels of income which may not
have been salient enough to detect any effects for money. There-
fore, in Study 1, effects of wealth on the good life were compared
across three levels of income, including below $10000/year (low
money), $31–40000/year (medium money), and over $200000/year
(high money).
In replication of previous work, we predicted happiness and
meaning in life (of the target) would have strong main effects on
the ratings of the life as desirable and morally good, with the happy
meaningful life being rated as most desirable and morally good. We
predicted that there would be no difference between medium and
high levels of income for the desirability of life. However, low levels
of income were expected to be least desirable – given that SWB
research has shown that once a person is able to meet life’s basic
needs, additional income has little effect on SWB (Diener et al.,
1985; Diener et al., 1993). In addition, in accord with the Protestant
work ethic, we predicted that moderate and high levels of income
would be rated as significantly morally superior to low levels of
income.
With regard to the influence of effort on the desirability of a life,
two predictions seemed possible. First, consistent with Csikszent-
mihalyi’s (1990) findings with regard to the undesirability of work,
it seemed likely that people would rate the easy life as more desir-
able than the hard life. However, the theories of optimal functioning
indicate that effort paired with meaning is a particularly salubrious
combination. If naïve notions of the good life are sensitive to this
notion, we would expect an effort X meaning interaction such that
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high effort paired with high meaning would be quite desirable. It
may be that the meaning attached to effort reduces it aversiveness.
Furthermore, we predicted an effort X money interaction such that
high effort would be undesirable except at high levels of income.
With regard to effort and moral goodness no main effects were
predicted. First, from the perspective of Weber’s argument, how
hard a person works to acquire wealth would be expected to be irrel-
evant to moral goodness. In other words, if material rewards alone
are a sign of God’s grace, then a person who makes over $200000 a
year with little effort would be considered morally equal to someone
who works hard to earn the same amount of money. On the other
hand, if idle hands are the devil’s instrument, then we would expect
that hard work would be rated as morally good. In addition, from
the perspective of the suffering servant, meaningful difficult work
on earth might be thought to relate to heavenly reward (e.g., Mother
Teresa).
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants
Four hundred thirty-eight surveys were distributed, but complete
data were obtained on 381 respondents2 (167 males, 212 females,
and 2 not reporting) whose ages ranged from 18 to 80 (M = 34.46,
SD = 12.40). Participants were recruited from the Dallas area at their
work places near the Southern Methodist University campus, or at
various airports in the continental U.S. Represented ethnic groups
included white/Anglo (77.1%), Black/African American (8.4%),
Hispanic (9.2%), Asian (3.7%), and other (1.6%). Participants were
approached by the experimenter or student from an upper level
psychology course who received extra credit for distributing the
questionnaires. All responses were anonymous.
Materials and Procedure
Participants examined a “Career Survey” (See Appendix A) ostens-
ibly completed by a target individual and made ratings about the
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target (King and Napa, 1998). Targets responses were “handwritten”
and designed so that all fictional targets had a bachelor’s degree,
and no information regarding gender or marital status was given.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 3 (high
vs. medium vs. low money) × 2 (high vs. low meaning) × 2
(high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low effort) between-subjects
design. For the high money condition, the target’s income was over
$200000 per year. For the medium and low money conditions,
the target earned $31000–40000 per year and less than $10000
per year, respectively. The amount of meaning in life the target
experienced was manipulated by 3 items including “My work is
very rewarding and I find it personally meaningful”. For the high
meaning condition, the target rated this item a 5 (completely true
of me) whereas targets for the low meaning condition rated this
item a 1 (completely false of me). Happiness was manipulated by
3 items including “At my job, I feel happy most of the time”. For
the high happiness condition, the target rated this item a 5 and for
the low happiness condition the target rated this item a 1. Effort
was manipulated by the number of hours targets worked. Effort
was manipulated with target reporting 60 (= high) vs. 20 (= low)
hours of work per week. Naturally, surveys completed by targets
who were making over $200000 per year while only working 15
hours per week warranted some explanation. In order to make the
surveys as realistic as possible, where the target indicated 15 hours
of work per week, two possible explanations were provided. Parti-
cipants in the low effort but high money condition (i.e., $200000
per year and 15 hours of work per week) viewed surveys completed
by targets who “inherited” their wealth. Participants in the low effort
and either medium or low money condition ($31000–40000 and less
than $10000 per year, respectively) viewed surveys completed by
targets who worked “part-time”.
Dependent Measures
Desirability of a life. Participants responded to three items: “How
much would you like to have this person’s life?” and “How much is
this person leading the good life?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5
(extremely much). Also, participants rated the quality of the target’s
life on a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high).
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Moral goodness. Participants responded to three questions. They
rated how good and moral they thought the target was, on a scale
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely much). Additionally, participants
read and completed the following rating:
Many religions and philosophies include the idea of a “final judgment”. If there
were such a thing as life after death, circle the number that best represents your
guess as to what this person would experience
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
punishment reward
(“hell”) (“heaven”)
As in previous work, we found participants were quite willing to
make this judgment. Although 1225 surveys were distributed, only
6% were returned without a response to this question.3
RESULTS
All dependent measures correlated highly with one another (Pear-
son’s r’s ranging from 0.36 to 0.79, p < 0.001). Therefore, a 2 (high
vs. low meaning) × 2 (high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low
effort) × 3 (high vs. medium vs. low money) multivariate analyses
of variance (MANOVA) was performed on the six dependent
measures. Table I summarizes the results across all three studies. To
avoid redundancy, we refer readers to Table I for the multivariate test
statistics. An effort X money interaction and a meaning X money
interaction qualified the main effects of happiness, meaning, and
money. We present univariate analyses only for those effects for
which the omnibus multivariate test reached significance.
Univariate tests revealed the effort X money interaction was
significant only for ratings of “How much would you like to have
this life?” (F(2,380) = 4.93, p < 0.01). When the life was presented
as either very poor (income less than $10000) or very wealthy
(income greater than $200000), effort made no difference in the
desirability of the life. However, for a life of medium wealth
($31000–40000), participants preferred an easy life over an effortful
one (see Figure 1). Interestingly, participants did not prefer the rich
easy life any more than a rich effortful life. These findings suggest
that the good life is sometimes equated with the easy life, and this
relationship is qualified by wealth.
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Figure 1. Study 1: Means for Effort X Money interaction for desirability of a
life.
The meaning X money interaction emerged for perceptions of
how much the target was leading the “good life” (F(2,380) = 3.77,
p < 0.05) and ratings of the person’s moral goodness (F(2,380) =
3.48, p < 0.05). Figure 2 (top panel) shows that a meaningless
life with little money was considered the least reflective of a good
life. Although high meaning was always preferable to low meaning,
this difference was greatest for the low money condition, perhaps
suggesting that wealth compensates for lack of meaning to some
extent. Similarly, although the target leading a meaningless life with
little money was rated lowest in moral goodness (see Figure 2,
bottom panel), the discrepancy between meaningful and meaning-
less lives was greatest under conditions of low income and least
pronounced under conditions of high income, as if the meaningful
life and meaningless life were virtually indistinguishable in terms of
moral goodness as long as the person was very wealthy – a finding
which highlights Weber’s notions that material success indicates
God’s favor.
Main effects for money reached significance only for the ques-
tions of desirability of the life (all three F(2,380)’s > 10, all p’s <
0.001). Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD at 0.05 level) revealed
that the high and medium-money conditions did not differ signifi-
cantly (M = 10.61 vs. M = 10.40), but the low-money condition
was different from the other two (M = 8.18), suggesting that money
may be an essential component of the good life but only to a certain
extent. This finding converges with work on the relation of income
to life satisfaction in that once the necessities of life are secured,
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Figure 2. Study 1: Means for Meaning X Money interaction for ratings of a good
life and moral goodness.
additional income has little relation to life satisfaction (Diener et
al., 1985; Diener et al., 1995).
Main effects for happiness and meaning replicated previous
findings (King and Napa, 1998) in that the happy life was more
desirable, more reflective of the “good life”, and higher in quality
of life than the unhappy life; also, the happy life was seen as more
good, moral, and likely to enter heaven (all F(1,380)’s > 8, all p’s <
0.001). Likewise, meaningful lives were rated as more desirable and
morally superior (all F(1,380)’s > 31, all p’s < 0.001) to meaningless
lives.
No main effects emerged for effort. Nor were there any signifi-
cant three or four-way interactions.4 In summary, folk conceptions
of the good life include happiness, meaning, and some minimal
amount of money. Our prediction that individuals would prefer high
effort when paired with high meaning was not supported. Nor did
hard work play a role in perceptions of moral goodness. If anything,
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the effort X money interaction suggests that individuals prefer the
easy life over a difficult one.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Results from this study replicated previous findings in that happi-
ness and meaning were overwhelmingly greater predictors of the
good life than money. The main effect for money was driven by
the sharp contrast between the low-money condition and the other
two conditions and was only relevant to the desirability of a life,
not moral judgments of the life. In short, people do not desire great
riches, although they want to avoid poverty.
Levels of wealth moderated the desirability of effort. When
income was $31000–40000 per year, participants preferred the low-
effort condition over the high-effort condition. Thus, it seems that
the desirable life may include a sense of a “free lunch” – the pay
off, without effort. One explanation of results with regard to effort
is that effort was operationalized as number of hours work. There
is certainly no reason to believe that people would want to work
long hours without sufficient justification such as greater income. In
fact, the law of least effort states that people will choose to expend
the minimal amount of energy required for maximum reward (Hull,
1943). In addition, the number of hours engaged in a job may have
little to do with the actual experience of engagement in the task
– individuals may clock in for a 10 hour day but spend much of
that time bored or watching the clock. Thus, it may be necessary to
operationalize effort in such a way as to specify the kind of active
engagement posited by theories of eudamonia or flow.
With this limitation in mind, Study 2 was designed to rein-
vestigate the relationship of effort to the good life by operation-
alizing effort in a different way – as expenditure of energy and
engagement in hard work. In addition, for Study 2, we were inter-
ested in examining whether the modest preference for the easy life
shown in Study 1 would generalize to college students as well as
community adults. Money was dropped as an independent variable,
as its relative unimportance in defining the good life has been well
demonstrated (Study 1 and King and Napa, 1998).
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Predictions for Study 2
We predicted effort would be related to higher quality of life and
higher moral goodness. Furthermore, we predicted a significant
meaning X effort interaction such that effort would be most desir-
able when paired with high meaning and most aversive when paired
with low meaning. Previous research (King and Napa, 1998) has
shown college students to be somewhat more idealistic in their
ratings of the good life, therefore we predicted that college students
would be more likely than noncollege adults to endorse effort as part
of the good life.
STUDY 2
METHOD
Participants4
Three hundred ninety-two surveys were distributed, and 366 were
returned with complete data (132 males, 232 females, 2 not
reporting). Participants included 188 undergraduates enrolled in an
introductory psychology class (Mean age = 19.24, SD = 2.31), and
178 community adults who were recruited by the students enrolled
in the class or individuals who were recruited at health fairs in and
around the Dallas area (Mean age = 41.84, SD = 13.15). Represented
ethnic groups within the college and community sample included
White/Anglo (78.7% and 74%), Black/African American (5.3% and
9.6%), Hispanic (9.0% and 13.6%), Asian (6.4% and 2.3%), and
other (0.5% and 0.6%).
Materials and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (high vs.
low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low meaning) × 2 (high vs. low effort)
between subjects design. Participants examined a “Career Survey”
similar to that used in Study 1, except the survey did not contain
information about the target’s income. Happiness and meaning were
both manipulated by targets’ responses to the same items used to
manipulate these variables in Study 1. Mixed in with the happiness
and meaning items were three additional items about the degree of
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effort the target exerted at his or her job. These items included “At
the end of my work day, I feel exhausted”, “My job requires hard
work”, and “My work requires my complete attention and involve-
ment in the entire process”. These items were rated on a scale from
1 (completely false of me) to 5 (completely true of me). In the
high-effort condition, targets rated the effort items as 5, 5, and 4,
respectively. In the low-effort condition, targets rated the items as 1,
1, and 2, respectively.
Dependent Measures
Participants completed dependent measures identical to those in
Study 1.5
RESULTS
Desirability of a Life6
Dependent measures were highly intercorrelated (p’s ranging from
0.42 to 0.75). A 2 (high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low
meaning) × 2 (high vs. low effort) × 2 (community vs. college
sample) MANOVA performed on the six dependent measures
revealed main effects for happiness, meaning, and effort. Main
effects were qualified by a three-way meaning X effort X sample
interaction. A happiness X meaning interaction and a happiness X
sample interaction also reached significance.7
Univariate tests showed that the meaning X effort X sample
interaction emerged for ratings of the desirability of the target’s
life and quality of the target’s life (F(1,365) = 8.54 and 14.84, both
p’s < 0.01). Figure 3 illustrates this cross-over interaction. College
students exhibited the meaning X effort interaction we predicted
in which high effort paired with high meaning was considered the
most desirable life; low meaning paired with high effort was the
least desirable. Community adults showed the opposite pattern – for
the meaningless life, high effort was preferred over low effort (M
= 4.19 vs. 3.35). For the condition of high meaning, they preferred
a life of ease rather than hard work. Similarly, among community
adults, meaning that can be acquired with low effort was indicative
of greater quality of life, whereas college students rate the combina-
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Figure 3. Study 2: Means for the Meaning X Effort X Sample interaction for
desirability of a life.
tion of hard work and meaning as highest in quality. These findings
suggest that community adults’ conceptions of the good life support
the notion that the good life is also the easy life, but that college
students may be more sensitive to the idea of effortful engagement.
Why would community adults prefer high effort for the mean-
ingless life? One explanation is that community adults may have
assumed hard work to bring a person other types of rewards
besides happiness and meaning – for instance, material rewards.
In the context of a meaningless life, working hard to earn a large
paycheck could be viewed as a consolation. College students may
have inferred the opposite – that hard work paired with meaningful
activity leads to greater economic reward. For instance, the item
“My work requires my complete attention and involvement in the
entire process” may have lead participants to conclude the target
had a more complex, and therefore higher paying job. However,
given the inconsistencies across the two samples (i.e., there is no
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reason to suspect one sample would make one type of inference
while another sample would not), and that the effects of wealth have
not been borne out in previous studies (Study 1 and King and Napa,
1998), it seems unlikely that participants were making inferences
about the targets wealth, but rather their judgments reflected their
ideas of effort and meaning as we intended.
If this is case, then, there are clear differences between the two
samples in their views of effort. College students appear to view the
good life in more optimistic terms – perhaps even naively ignoring
the importance of material goods and overemphasizing the impact
of personal efforts in life success, while community adults were
more pragmatic. Interestingly, past research (King and Napa, 1998)
has shown that non-college adults place more emphasis on the
role of money in the good life than college students. Also, differ-
ences in life domains between the two samples may explain why
effort was viewed more positively by college students. For instance,
community adults may have more areas of life which require the
investment of effort (e.g., work, family, community, etc.). In partic-
ular, the manipulation of effort included one item which tapped into
energy depletion – “At the end of my work day, I feel exhausted”.
Community adults may have interpreted effort put into work as
detracting from time and energy spent with their families.
The happiness X sample interaction emerged for the desirability
of the life and also for judgments of heavenly reward (F(1,365) =
4.09 and 3.92, both p’s < 0.05). Although both samples preferred a
happy life over an unhappy one, college students rated the unhappy
life lower than community adults, while community adults rated the
happy life lower on desirability than the college students. These
findings underscore the importance of personal happiness, espe-
cially within the context of the work environment, for college
students. With regard to judgments of heavenly reward, ratings of
the happy person were virtually identical across samples – both
college students and community adults strongly believed the happy
person was bound for heaven. However, community adults judged
the unhappy target more harshly than college students – giving
the unhappy target a rating of 5.79 (where 1 = “hell” and 10 =
“heaven”). Compared to ratings for the happy life (M = 7.01
for community adults), it appears that community adults consider
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personal happiness more of a moral duty. The unhappy person’s
chances of entering heaven seem questionable.
The happiness X meaning interaction was significant only for
ratings of the desirability of the life (F(1,365) = 14.19, p < 0.001).
This interaction shows that people give the highest ratings to the
combination of high happiness and high meaning, replicating the
findings from King and Napa (1998).
While we did not find effort per se to be desirable, participants
nonetheless indicated that effort has some moral value. For ques-
tions of how moral and how good is this person, main effects for
effort emerged (F(1,365) = 12.05 and 4.00, both p’s < 0.05). Com-
pared to the easy life, the life of hard work was rated higher on both
of these measures.
Overall, main effects for happiness indicated that respondents
rated the happy life higher than the unhappy life on measures of
desirability of the life, quality of life, and resemblance to the “good
life” (all F(1,365)’s > 95, all p’s < 0.001). Furthermore, the happy
person was considered more moral, more good, and more likely to
go to heaven than the unhappy person (all F(1,365)’s > 15, all p’s <
0.001). Main effects for meaning paralleled findings for happiness.
In general, the meaningful life was more desirable than the mean-
ingless one on all accounts (all F(1,365)’s > 113, all p’s < 0.001).
Participants also rated the target leading a meaningful life higher
in morality and goodness than the target leading a meaningless
life (both F(1,365)’s > 43, both p’s < 0.001). Meaning in life also
played considerable importance in judgments of heavenly reward
(F(1,365) = 54.33, p < 0.001).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of Study 2 indicate that, generally, when effort is oper-
ationalized as effortful engagement in hard work, it is perceived
somewhat more positively. The main effects that emerged for effort
indicated effort was viewed as morally good, but not desirable.
However, college students showed some preference for the hard-
working, meaningful life whereas community adults tended to
prefer the easy, meaningful life.
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Limitations arising out of our operationalization of effort in the
present study warrant discussion. Study 2 operationalized effort in
a way that departs from self-determination theory, which emphas-
izes the importance of autonomy in intrinsically motivated activities
(Deci and Ryan, 1995). In trying to capture the realistic aspects of a
job, we manipulated effort with items such as “My job requires hard
work” and “My work requires my complete attention and involve-
ment in the entire process” which did not tap into the dimension
of personal choice. Since self-determination theorists posit personal
freedom (“autonomy”) as one of the three central and universal
human needs (Ryan and Deci, 2001), Study 3 sought to address the
issue of choice with regard to the value of effort in a good life.
Additionally, we dropped the item about feeling exhausted at the
end of the day for three reasons. First, it was difficult to word the
exhaustion question in terms of personal choice vs. task demands.
Second, the notion of having one’s energy depleted raised the issue
of whether our sample might be concerned that the effort required
for this job would rob them of energy for other life domains. Finally,
theories of flow and intrinsic motivation might suggest that one
is energized by these activities and that drawing attention to the
energy depletion might carry a more negative connotation than is
appropriate.
Neither of the previous studies included manipulation checks to
ensure that participants were responding to our manipulations in the
ways intended. Furthermore, we were interested in probing whether
our manipulations might actually impact on the amount of the inde-
pendent variables participants assumed the target was experiencing.
For example, does meaning add to perceptions of happiness? And
does happiness add to perceptions of meaningfulness? Is the combi-
nation of happiness and effort related to attributions of greater
meaning? Alternatively, hard work may be difficult to separate from
meaning, so effort alone might enhance attributions of meaning.
Finally, we note that Studies 1 and 2 relied on convenience sam-
ples – individuals who were recruited from a variety of situations by
psychology students. In Study 3, we sought to collect data from a
more randomly selected sample – relying on the random selection
of registered voters in Dallas County who were selected for jury
duty. Though this sample is still drawn from a particular context –
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an urban setting in the southwest, Study 3 avoids the kind of selec-
tion bias that may have reduced the generalizability of the first two
studies.
Overview and Predictions for Study 3
In Study 3, a sample of registered voters who had been contacted
by the Dallas County Court System were recruited to participate
in the study. Materials for this study were identical to those in the
previous studies, except that the factor of personal choice was added
by subtly changing the wording of the effort items. In the low choice
condition, effort was portrayed as required by the task (e.g., “My
work takes a lot of effort”; “My work requires a lot of hard work”).
In the high choice condition, effort was made a personal choice of
the target (e.g., “I put a lot of effort into my work”; “I work hard at
my job”).
For Study 3, we predicted that the strong effects for happiness
and meaning would again replicate. In addition, we predicted that
high effort would be associated with greater desirability and moral
goodness. Furthermore, according to self-determination theory, we
would predict an effort X choice interaction such that high effort
paired with high choice would be associated with highest levels of
desirability and moral goodness. In addition, we predicted that low
effort/high choice individuals would be judged as most immoral –
since this pattern would seem to indicate that an individual chooses
to be “lazy” and is therefore more responsible than one who fails to
work hard simply because a job does not require it.
With regard to our manipulation checks, we predicted that happi-
ness and meaning would provide additive effects on one another
such that meaning would enhance the effects of the happiness
manipulation on happiness judgments and happiness would enhance
the effects of the meaning manipulation on judgments of meaning-
fulness. Finally, we predicted that effort would also be associated
with enhanced attributions of meaningfulness.
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STUDY 3
METHOD
Participants7
Three hundred ninety-five participants surveys were distributed to
individuals waiting to be selected as jurors for the Dallas County
jury pool. Complete data were obtained on 275 participants (124
males, 150 females, 1 not reporting).8 Mean age of participants
was 42.03 (SD = 12.09). Represented ethnic groups included
White/Anglo (77.4%), Black/African American (10.6%), Hispanic
(8%), Asian (2.2%), and other (1.8%). Participants were offered a
piece of candy in return for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of sixteen cells in a 2
(high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low meaning) × 2 (high
vs. low effort) × 2 (chosen effort vs. taskdictated effort) between
subjects design. The target stimulus was a “Career Survey” similar
to that used in Study 2. However, in the present study we changed
the wording of the effort questions to reflect personal choice or
not. Effort items distinguished between effort which was “required”
by the job itself (no choice effort condition: e.g., “My work takes
a lot of effort” “My work requires a lot of hard work” and “My
work requires my complete attention and involvement in the entire
process”) and effort which was chosen by the target (choice effort
condition: e.g., “I put a lot of effort into my work” “I work hard at
my job” and “I take great care in my work and am deeply involved
in the entire process”). As was the case in the first two studies, these
items were rated on a scale from 1 (completely false of me) to 5
(completely true of me). For both surveys, participants in the high
effort condition viewed surveys in which the effort items were rated
5, 5, and 4, respectively. Participants in the low effort condition
viewed surveys in which the effort items were rated 1, 1, and 2,
respectively. Happiness and meaning were manipulated using the
same items as were used in Studies 1 and 2, and no information
about the target’s income was included.
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Figure 4. Study 3: Means for the Meaning X Effort X Choice interaction for
moral goodness.
Dependent Measures
Participants completed the same dependent measures as in Studies
1 and 2. As a manipulation check of our independent variables,
participants were asked how happy they thought the target was, how
much they thought the target was leading a meaningful life, and how
lazy they thought the target was on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely
much) scale.
RESULTS
Desirability of a Life9
All dependent measures correlated from 0.44 to 0.81, therefore a 2
(high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low meaning) × 2 (high vs.
low effort) × 2 (no choice vs. choice) MANOVA was performed
on the dependent measures. Main effects for happiness, meaning,
effort, and choice were qualified by a significant three-way meaning
X effort X choice interaction. Additionally, two significant two-way
interactions emerged: happiness X meaning and happiness X effort.
Univariate tests reveled that the meaning X effort X choice inter-
action reached significance only for ratings of “How good is this
person?” Figure 4 indicates that the highest ratings of moral good-
ness were for the meaningful life of “required” effort. There was no
difference in ratings of the meaningless life of chosen hard work vs.
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the meaningful life of chosen hard work. However, lives of chosen
ease were rated as less moral. Targets who were not working hard,
and who led meaningless lives by choice were seen as most despic-
able. Thus, the factor of choice appeared to have its strongest effects
on making the easy life appear more egregious if self-determined,
and the effortful life as more moral if not self-determined. One
possibility is that participants viewed those targets whose work
“required” them to work hard as fulfilling a need that the situation
provided, perhaps answering to a sense of duty or obligation to a
greater cause.
The significant happiness X meaning interaction emerged for all
dependent measures except responses to “How good is this person?”
(all F(1,274)’s > 4, all p’s < 0.05). Consistent with findings from
Study 2 and King and Napa (1998), respondents reported an over-
whelming preference for the combination of high happiness and
high meaning compared to alternative combinations of happiness
and meaning.
Of greater theoretical interest is the happiness X effort interaction
which emerged for all measures of the desirability of a life (“How
much would you like to have this life?” “How much is this person
leading the good life?” and ratings of the target’s quality of life).
The pattern for these interactions was identical across measures;
thus, Figure 5 shows the means for only the desirability of the life.
As shown, effort was irrelevant in ratings of the desirability of an
unhappy life (M’s = 7.59 for high effort vs. 6.92 for low effort),
but for ratings of the happy life, effort added significantly to the
desirability of the life (M’s = 11.83 for high effort vs. 8.88 for low
effort). These results seem to indicate that within the context of
a happy life, hard work is seen as a positive feature. In addition,
it is notable that no significant differences emerged with regard to
whether effort was presented as a personal choice or a given feature
of one’s job. We speculate that the life of hard, happy work may
have been viewed as most fun.
Overall, significant main effects for happiness indicated that the
happy life was rated as more desirable than the unhappy life (all
F(1,274)’s > 43, all p’s < 0.001) and more morally good (F(1,274) =
4.20, p < 0.05). Univariate tests for “How moral is this person?”
and likelihood of heavenly reward did not attain significance. With
regards to the main effects for meaning, the meaningful life scored
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Figure 5. Study 3: Means for the Happiness X Effort interaction for desirability
of a life.
higher than the meaningless life on all measures of desirability and
moral goodness (all F(1,274)’s > 20, all p’s < 0.001). Main effects
for effort were also robust across all six dependent measures such
that hard work was more preferable, and morally superior to the
easy life (all F(1,274)’s > 4, all p’s < 0.05), suggesting that effort
per se may be a desirable component of the good life, especially
when operationalized as effortful engagement and not confused with
energy depletion.
Manipulation Checks
A 2 (high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low meaning) × 2
(high vs. low effort) × 2 (high vs. low effort choice) MANOVA
was performed on the three manipulation check items: “How happy
is this person?” “How meaningful is this person’s life?” and “How
lazy is this person?” in order to examine, first, if our manipulations
worked and, second, to see if there were unexpected interactive
effects of the independent variables on each other. First, main
effects emerged for happiness, meaning, and effort (see Table II
for test statistics), indicating that our manipulations did work – the
happy life was rated as happier, the meaningful life rated as more
meaningful, and the easy life received higher ratings of laziness.
A significant happiness X meaning interaction and a happiness
X effort interaction also emerged. For the happiness X meaning
interaction, univariate tests reached significance for all ratings of
happiness, meaningfulness, and laziness (all F’s(1,271) > 4, all p’s <
0.05). Figure 6 shows the means for these interactions. The happy
and meaningful life was rated highest in happiness (M = 3.46) and
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TABLE II
Summary of multivariate analyses of manipulation checks
Study 3
wilk’s F3,254
Lambda
Main effects H 0.52 77.82∗∗∗
Me 0.73 32.04∗∗∗
E 0.83 16.90∗∗∗
Two-way interactions H×Me 0.93 6.27∗∗∗
H×E 0.94 5.61∗∗
Me×C 0.97 2.25†
E×C 0.97 2.26†
Study 3 independent variables = Happiness (H), Meaning (Me),
Effort (E), Choice (C)
†p = .80, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
meaning (M = 4.25) and lowest in laziness (M = 2.09). The unhappy,
meaningless life was rated least happy (M = 1.60) and meaningful
(M = 1.76), but not the most lazy (M = 2.59). The laziest target
was one leading a happy, meaningless life (M = 2.84). If unhap-
piness is viewed as a motivating state (i.e., a state which might
lead one to take action and make changes), then the combination of
happiness and meaninglessness may have been judged particularly
harshly because participants inferred the target was not working to
overcome his/her state of meaninglessness.
The happiness X effort interaction emerged as significant for all
three manipulation check variables (all F(1,271)’s > 4, all p’s <
0.05). Figure 7 shows the means for how happy, meaningful, and
lazy participants thought the target was. The life high in happiness
and effort was rated as most happy (M = 3.87), most meaningful
(M = 3.14), and least lazy (M = 1.66). Again, we suspect that parti-
cipants viewed this life as most fun. Interestingly, the combination
of high happiness and low effort resulted in the highest ratings of
laziness (M = 3.27). Similar to the happy meaningless target, the
happy lazy person might have been perceived as self-satisfied or
complacent.
In general, there was contamination between the concepts of
happiness and meaning, attesting to the difficulty in separating the
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Figure 6. Study 3 Manipulation Checks: Means for Happiness X Meaning inter-
action.
Figure 7. Study 3 Manipulation Checks: Means for Happiness X Effort inter-
action.
two constructs. Main effects revealed that the happy life was rated as
more meaningful than the unhappy life (F(1,271) = 19.95, p < 0.001,
M = 2.69 vs. 2.14). The meaningful life was considered happier than
the meaningless life (F(1,271) = 43.89, p < 0.001, M = 3.09 vs. 2.28),
the meaningless life was perceived as higher in laziness (F(1,271) =
6.61, p < 0.02, M = 3.82 vs. 3.67). But happiness alone had no effect
on perceptions of laziness (F(1,271) = 0.32, n.s.). The direction of the
main effect for effort indicated that participants perceived high effort
alone to be more meaningful than low effort (F(1,271) = 15.54, p <
0.001).
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Finally, a meaning X choice interaction and an effort X choice
interaction approached significance. Means from these interactions
revealed that respondents gave highest ratings of meaningfulness
to the target who was leading a meaningful life not by choice – a
finding which contradicts self-determination theory which emphas-
izes the importance of being able to choose one’s activities. Also,
the life of self-determined ease (low effort by choice) was rated the
laziest of all combinations of choice and effort.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Is effort part of The Good Life? The answer to this question seems
to be “it depends” – it depends on who is making the judgment, the
kind of effort required, and what else the person is experiencing.
Study 1 indicated that the good life is clearly the easy life when
it comes to working long hours. In addition, the predicted inter-
actions of meaning X effort and money X effort did not emerge.
In fact, at moderate levels of income the easy life was definitely
preferred. For Study 2, effort operationalized as engagement in a
task and energy depletion, was viewed somewhat more positively,
particularly by college students as opposed to community adults.
The community adults showed clear preference for an easy life of
meaningful activity.
Finally, in Study 3, when effort was operationalized only as
effortful engagement and not confused with energy depletion, effort
was a preferred aspect of the good life. In addition, Study 3 showed
that effort was most desirable in the context of an already happy life.
Effort was also recognized as a moral good in Study 3, though, inter-
estingly, effort was most valued when it was not chosen, and the lack
of effort was most condemned when it was chosen. Finally, effort,
when combined with other aspects of the good life, was shown to
enhance attributions of happiness and meaning.
Although there were some consistencies across the results of the
three studies, there were also some inconsistencies as well. One way
to clarify these inconsistencies is to consider how much effort in
one life domain conflicts with other life domains. With regard to
work hours (as in Study 1), this issue is paramount – time spent at
work cannot be invested in family or social activities. With regard
to energy expenditure, it may have been assumed by participants in
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Study 2 that a person who is exhausted at the end of the work day is
therefore unable to expend energy in other life domains. In Study 3,
when this item was removed effort was perceived more positively.
Thus, active engagement in effortful activity may be viewed as an
important part of a meaningful life – but only if there is a possibility
of balance with other life interests. This explanation might also
serve to justify the differences found between college and noncol-
lege participants in Study 2. Noncollege adults may have a greater
number of other commitments and may therefore be more sensitive
to the sacrifice that effort in the area of work may require for other
life domains.
It is also notable that the way effort was operationalized in the
first two studies might have seemed aversive. Is effort which is
operationalized as engagement that does not deplete energy really
effort at all? Ironically, the results of Study 3 suggest that people
are willing to work hard – but only if it is easy. Which of these
operational definitions best represents the experience of effort in
daily life is debatable.
The Relation between Effort and Happiness
In Study 3, effort interacted with happiness to predict desirability.
We have suggested that the tendency to view this combination as
desirable may represent the naïve psychologist’s recognition of flow.
In the context of a happy person, effort was seen as enhancing exper-
ienced happiness and meaning in life. The combination of happiness
and effort certainly jibes with a variety of perspectives on optimal
functioning.
Participants may have assumed that the target who was happy
and engaged in a difficult task was performing successfully – a
variable that was ignored in the present study. Perhaps one of the
chief pay-offs of hard work is a high quality product. Engagement
in difficult tasks may be more desirable when the quality of one’s
work is of interest. Future research that incorporates the variable of
quality would allow us to examine the extent to which a job well
done serves as its own reward.
Paradoxical Impact of Choice
One interesting result of Study 3 was that chosen effort was often
seen as less good than task-required effort. One way to view these
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results is to consider that indiscriminately working hard may be
viewed somewhat less positively than working hard when it is
required by a task. It may be that individuals who are perceived
as just always working hard are assumed to be low in ability (e.g.,
Dweck et al., 1995; Elliott and Dweck, 1988; c.f., Shepperd et al.,
1994).
Another interpretation of this finding is that high effort, regard-
less of its origins in the person or the task tends to be seen as doing
one’s duty – meeting task demands. Individuals who expend low
effort because a task does not demand it would also be seen as
fulfilling their duty. In contrast, a low effort individual who chooses
to expend low effort may be viewed as shirking his or her duties.
The demand is so obvious for individuals to say they choose to work
hard, it is difficult to imagine participants not judging quite harshly
an individual who brazenly admits to being deliberately lazy.
Limitations and Areas for Future Research
The present studies must be interpreted with the caveat that they
represent culture specific, historically situated notions of the good
life. Certainly, there are few areas in which cultures would disagree
more than on definitions of the good life. Leisure and personal
happiness, for example, are largely Western and modern concerns
(Engel, 1988). And definitions of effort vary widely from culture to
culture. In American society, people’s motivation is largely based
on the cultural stereotype of work as something to be avoided as
much as possible (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) or as simply a means
to an end, whereas in Japan, effort is viewed more positively
because it is believed that there are intrinsic benefits to persisting
at tasks (Holloway, 1988). However, given that the bulk of studies
on subjective wellbeing have been conducted in Western soci-
eties, the present studies, although limited, serve as a good start to
understanding what makes a life good.
These three studies, as well as our previous work, have taken
a “one size fits all” approach to defining the good life. The large
effects we have obtained for variables like happiness and meaning
justify this approach, to some extent. However, even robust compo-
nents of the good life may be relative values. It may be that some
individuals sacrifice happiness to accomplish other goals, others
sacrifice meaning in the service of money, or sacrifice prestige in
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the service of meaning. Research that allows for the tailoring of
values to individual lives will be necessary to uncover the individual
differences that drive the constructions of the variety of possible
good lives.
Effort, Happiness, and Meaning
One explanation for why individuals may not value effort as essen-
tial to leading a good life is that hard work may very well have little
to do with meaning and happiness for the average American worker.
Modern capitalist society has largely been blamed for reducing labor
to simply a means of serving consumption whereas other systems,
such as Buddhism, value labor as the primary means of expression
of human creativity – essentially, the expression of one’s true being
(Schummacher, 1973). However, as employees have become more
specified in their tasks and less identified with the end-product of
their labors, effort has come to be regarded as no more than an
exchange for a weekly paycheck. Job satisfaction research reveals
that the most satisfied employees are the ones who feel a sense of
control over their work and that their efforts have impact (Myers,
1992). In fact, Gagne, Senecal and Koestner (1997) found task
significance and meaningfulness were the greatest predictors of
intrinsic motivation and satisfaction at work. Unfortunately, this
means that upper-level employees, such as those at the managerial
level or higher, tend to be more satisfied than those in lower-status
positions (Myers, 1992). Furthermore, the crux of programs such
as unemployment and welfare compensation is that they are erro-
neously believed to be adequate replacements for meaningful work
– thereby robbing workers of their essential value as human beings.
It is notable that the strongest effects were, as in previous work,
for happiness and meaning. In general, people want happy and
meaningful lives. Dedication to difficult work may have its most
important impact on the good life via its relation to pleasant affect.
Apparently, happiness has the capacity to transform even onerous
tasks into desirable and morally good occupations. Quite simply,
individuals who enjoy the difficult work in which they are engaged
are seen as leading desirable, good lives. Happy individuals who opt
for the easy life, in contrast, take a less desirable and even morally
questionable path.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE CAREER SURVEY FOR STUDY 1
Name 
Place of Employment 
What is your highest level of education? (Check one)
Grade school High school Some college
B.A./B.S. 4 M.A./M.S. Ph.D. Other (explain)
What is your combined family income? (Check one)
Less than $10000 $11–20000 $21–30000
$31–40000 4 $41–50000 $51–70000
$71–100000 $100–200000 greater than $200000
Please estimate the total number of hours you spend working each week
(include time spent at your place of employment and time spent working
at home) 60
If your response to the previous question was less than 20 hours, please
explain:
Rate the following items with regard to how much each is true of you in
your job, using the scale below:
1 2 3 4 5
completely completely
false of me true of me
5 My work is very rewarding and I find it personally meaningful.
1 I truly enjoy going to work everyday.
5 In my job I really feel like I am touching the lives of people.
2 At my job, I feel happy most of the time.
5 My job involves a lot of hassles.
4 My work will leave a legacy for future generations.
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NOTES
1 Aristotle’s notion of happiness as the ultimate goal is a frequently cited yet
widely misunderstood concept that traces its roots to the unfortunate translation
of eudaimonia as happiness (Kraut, 1979; Telfer, 1980; Waterman, 1990a). Inter-
estingly, had eudaimonia been interpreted differently, research on positive func-
tioning may well have taken an entirely different course (Ryff, 1989; Waterman,
1990a).
2 For all three studies, individuals included in the subsample did not differ from
the larger sample set in age, ethnicity, or responses to any of our dependent
variables.
3 Since religiosity might be expected to relate to this last question, participants’
selfreported religiosity was measured by asking “How important is religion in
your life?” and “How much do your personal religious beliefs influence your daily
decisions?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely much). Composite religi-
osity scores were computed as a mean of the two items (α = 0.83). For all analyses,
when religiosity was included as a covariate, results were virtually identical to the
MANOVA. Therefore, we present the more parsimonious analyses.
4 Multivariate tests for meaning X effort and happiness X money interactions
approached significance. We do not interpret these marginally significant interac-
tions given that they were unpredicted and the probability of attaining a significant
interaction in a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 design is greater than 0.05.
5 Also, religiosity was measured using the same items as in Study 1 (α = 0.84).
6 When we included religiosity and age as covariates, results were essentially the
same as the MANOVA.
7 A meaning X effort interaction also emerged, but we do not interpret this inter-
action because the meaning X effort X sample interaction supersedes the two-way
interaction.
8 Many more surveys were returned incomplete for this sample than those in
Studies 1 and 2. Participants did not have as much time to complete the surveys as
in Studies 1 and 2, and may have been less familiar with the format of psychology
surveys and scales.
9 Religiosity was measured using the same items as in Study 1 (α = 0.78), but
when this measure was included as a covariate, results did not differ from the
MANOVA.
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